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Disability Insurance in California
The health insurance industry has received a considerable amount
of attention in the last few years due to a number of factors. Per-
haps the maj or factor behind this public attention is the realization
that the American family is not adequately protected from the fi-
nancial burdens of catastrophic illness. Total incapacity due to can-
cer, kidney disease, or some other debilitation can cripple a family,
both emotionally and financially. The health insurance industry
has not been able to solve this dilemma. Even though some charita-
ble hospitals and "health maintenance organizations" such as
Kaiser-Permanente have helped alleviate many of these problems,
their impact is limited.
Medical spending in this country has increased from 3.6% of the
G.N.P. in 1929 to 7.5% of the G.N.P. today, with the prospect of
a 10% share in less than twenty-five years.' The disability seg-
ment of the insurance industry collected premiums in 1973 which
were in the billions of dollars. 2 However, the public's reliance on
health insurance has proved to be unworthy. The industry's prime
objective is to make as large a profit as possible. One way to ac-
complish this task is to limit the payment of claims. The health
insurance companies can create such a windfall by (1) selling pol-
icies with exclusions that make them nearly worthless and (2) re-
peatedly resisting claims that appear legitimate.3 However, it has
only been recently in California that the insurance industry has
been subject to severe financial penalties for refusing to pay legiti-
mate claims. The insured can now recover punitive damages, 4
which have amounted to hundreds of thousands of dollars per case,
and the insured now has a cause of action for bad faith against
the insurance company.5 But even with these remedies, the insured
may have to wait years to recover, and the difficulty of proving
1. Los Angeles Times, February 17, 1974, § IX (Opinion), at 5, col. -.
2. Wall Street Journal, January 28, 1974, at 1, col. 8.
3. Id.
4. Wetherbee v. United Ins. Co., 265 Cal. App. 2d 921, 71 Cal. Rptr. 764
(1968).
5. Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 9 Cal. 3d 566, 510 P.2d 1032, 108 Cal.
Rptr. 480 (1973).
bad faith and the uncertainty of punitive damages may still leave
the insured unsatisfied.
Wilbur Cohen, Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare under
President Johnson, said that the time for national health insurance
had come ".... [T] he question no longer is whether every American
should be protected by comprehensive coverage, but how and
when."6 Significant discussion is now underway in Congress con-
cerning changes in health care coverage. Two major proposals,
one by President Nixon and the other by Senator Kennedy, provide
for a national health insurance plan. However, both the Nixon
plan 7 and Senator Kennedy's present plan8 allow participation by
private health insurance companies. With the present national
health insurance plans providing for participation by private in-
surance companies, it must be determined whether these companies
can provide adequate service to the public. To assist in this
national evaluation, this comment will examine California law con-
cerning disability insurance as it relates to pre-existing conditions
and the cancellation or termination of health insurance policies.
As defined in this state by the California Insurance Code § 106,
Disability insurance includes insurance appertaining to injury,
disablement or death resulting to the insured from accidents, and
appertaining to disablements resulting to the insured from sickness.
Additionally, in the code Commission Notes it is stated that
" 'Sickness and either accident or health' changed to 'disability'
throughout code. Definition and scope remain in substance".
PRE-EXISTING CONDITIONS
A. The California Cases
In 1967 a new regulation affecting pre-existing conditions was
issued by the California Insurance Commissioner:
(C) A policy, certificate of credit insurance or notice of proposed
insurance shall not contain provisions which would encourage mis-
representation or which are unjust, unfair, inequitable, misleading,
deceptive, or contrary to law or to the public policy of this State
(2) A credit disability insurance policy violates this subsection
if it: ...
6. Los Angeles Times, February 17, 1974, § IX (Opinion), at 5.
7. Id.
8. Los Angeles Times, April 3, 1974, at 14, col. 2. Senator Kennedy's
original proposal did not provide for participation by private health insur-
ance companies-see Los Angeles Times, February 17, 1974, § IX (Opinion),
at 5. However, the new plan seems to provide for some participation.
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(F) excludes coverages for pre-existing conditions other
than those for which medical advice, consultation or
treatment was required or recommended within ...
the six months following effective date of the insur-
ance coverage.9
This provision was long in coming and will greatly aid the insured
if it is followed by the insurance companies and enforced by the
Insurance Commissioner. If neither party upholds this provision,
the courts may need to intervene to determine its application. The
problem with this administrative regulation, barring a court deci-
sion to the contrary, is that the section is not retroactive. It does
not apply to disability insurance contracts entered into prior to
August, 1967. To determine the law in California as it affected pre-
existing conditions prior to this administrative regulation, one
must analyze the case law on the subject.
There are only four California cases dealing directly with pre-
existing conditions. The oldest of the four is Fohl v. Metropolitan
Life Insurance Co.10 In December, 1921, Mr. Fohl and Metropolitan
entered into a contract of insurance. The contract provided that
the company would pay benefits to plaintiff if he became totally
and permanently disabled as the result of injury or disease occur-
ring and originating after the issuance of the policy.
In February, 1920, prior to the issuance of this insurance policy,
Mr. Fohl was placed in a hospital in Stockton. Upon examination
he was found to have a strongly positive syphilitic reaction. On
March 28 he was released from the hospital and returned to work.
The evidence showed a general decline in the plaintiff's condition
over the next several years. In December, 1921, upon contracting
with defendant for insurance, Mr. Fohl did not disclose this prior
condition nor the treatment he received. Finally, in December, 1928,
plaintiff experienced a seizure and was placed in a sanitarium until
June, 1929 when he was released and returned to work. In October,
1930 he experienced two additional epileptic seizures and, after
December 23, 1930, was unable to work again. Plaintiff main-
tained that he was totally and permanently disabled after December
23, 1930. The defendant insurance company refused payment,
relying on the defense of an undisclosed pre-existing condition.
9. CAL. ADMIN. CODE, Title 10, § 2248.9 (c) (2) (F) (1967).
10. 54 Cal. App. 2d 368, 129 P.2d 24 (1942).
The court described Mr. Fohl's illness as a latent condition which
failed to manifest itself for some eight years after the issuance of
the policy. The court maintained that it was epilepsy, not syphilis,
which was the disabling disease:
• .. [E]ven though the medical cause of the disease which re-
sulted in the incompetent's disability may have antedated the is-
suance of the policy, where, as here, the disease did not manifest
itself for years after such issuance, the plaintiff is entitled to the
disability benefits under the policy. 1
The next such case ruled upon by the California courts was
Skroopka v. Royal Indemnity Co.12 In this case, the plaintiff and
defendant entered into an insurance contract in September, 1952.
The contract insured plaintiff against loss resulting from acci-
dental bodily injury and sickness. The policy, provided, however,
that benefits would be paid only for sickness or injury contracted
thirty days after the policy came into effect. Since the age of
twenty, Mrs. Skroopka, age forth-seven, had consistently experi-
enced pain in her breasts prior to menstruation. She had consulted
physicians in the past concerning her problem but received no sug-
gestions. In May, 1952, plaintiff again consulted a physician con-
cerning this pain, but no medical treatment was prescribed. The
doctor suggested that she watch the condition, since he had just
operated on her sister for breast cancer. Finally, in December, 1952,
the doctor conducted an exploratory operation. The growth was
benign, and Mrs. Skroopka subsequently filed a claim with the
insurance company to receive payment for the operation. The
defendant denied the claim, basing its refusal on the defense of a
pre-existing condition. The insurance company maintained that
since Mrs. Skroopka had had this condition since she was twenty
years old, it constituted a pre-existing condition.
The court relied on the Fohl decision and found for the defendant
insurance company. The opinion stated that the presence of
nodules or lumps in the breast was the manifestation of the sick-
ness. Since these lumps had existed from age twenty, the sickness
was a pre-existing condition.
It seems unescapable ... that the "sickness"-if such it may be
called-which occasioned the hospitalization and surgery-was a
condition of the breasts ... that existed prior to the effective date
of the policy without regard to whether or not surgery ultimately
disclosed a benign or malignant condition.' 3
11. 54 Cal. App. 2d at 379, 129 P.2d at 29.
12. 132 Cal. App. 2d 910, 283 P.2d 111 (1955).
13. 132 Cal. App. 2d at 913, 283 P.2d at 113.
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In 1960 the third California appellate decision concerning pre-ex-
isting conditions was decided. This decision, entitled Cimino v. Re-
serve Life Insurance Co., 14 concerned an insurance contract which
limited coverage to hospital confinement resulting from sickness
which originated more that fifteen days after the effective date of
the policy. The policy in question took effect in March, 1958. On
May 17, 1958, the insured's son experienced a high fever and a sharp
pain in his right hip and was unable to straighten his right leg.
He had experienced a similar pain in that area for about two years,
but had not consulted a physician with regard to the condition until
May 20, 1958. Prior to May 17, he had been in excellent health,
attending school regularly and playing on the school football team.
He was finally hospitalized 'between May 22 and July 2, 1958 and
underwent surgery for osteomyelitis.
Defendant insurance company refused payment under the policy,
basing its decision upon the boy's pre-existing condition. The court
disagreed with defendant and maintained that the sickness had be-
come manifest more than fifteen days after the issuance of the
policy. The opinion stated that a sickness begins when it first mani-
fests itself or becomes active or "when sufficient symptoms existed
to allow a reasonably accurate diagnosis of the case."' ' The phrase
"hospital confinement resulting from sickness" does not mean a
general diseased condition or ill health, but a condition which mani-
fests into the cause of the hospital confinement. Furthermore, the
term sickness refers to a condition wherein the patient cannot con-
duct his usual activities. In this case, plaintiff's son attended
school, participated in athletics, and was generally able to engage
in normal activities until May 17. The court concluded that:
... The pre-existing condition had not manifest itself by anything
more substantial than an occasional pain or spasm . . . [and] was
latent and inactive within the meaning of Fohl .... 16
The most recent California case concerning pre-existing condi-
tions is Bower v. Roy-Al Corporation17 which incorporated the
other three cases in its decision. This case involved an insurance
policy effective April, 1966, which provided for continued automo-
14. 181 Cal. App. 2d 840, 5 Cal. Rptr. 850 (1960).
15. 181 Cal. App. 2d at 842, 5 Cal. Rptr. at 851.
16. 181 Cal. App. 2d at 843, 5 Cal. Rptr. at 852.
17. 33 Cal. App. 3d 1027, 109 Cal. Rptr. 612 (1973).
bile payments in case the insured suffered from total and continuous
disability caused by accidental bodily injury or sickness, but ex-
cluded from coverage accidents occurring or disease contracted
prior to the effective date of the policy. Since the policy was issued
prior to the California Insurance Commissioner's Regulation § 2248.9
(C) (2) (F), that section could not be relied upon by the court.
Three weeks after the policy went into effect, plaintiff was working
at the top of a telephone pole and his legs "went to sleep". He
later complained of limping and lameness in his legs. In June, 1966,
surgery was performed, and the doctor concluded that plaintiff suf-
fered from total and continuous disability due to vascular insuffi-
ciency in his lower extremities. The insurance company refused
payment, contending that the condition was pre-existing and must
have developed over an extended period of time.
The court distinguished this case from Fohl, noting that in Fohl
the disease (epilepsy) originated after the policy date, and it was
a different disease from the syphilis. However, the Fohl case was
significant in that it stated the general rule that a ". . . sickness
originates when it becomes manifest or acute rather than at the
time of its medical cause or origin". 18 The court maintained that
this rule applied "... even though the medical cause may have
antedated the policy ....
The Bower case, in holding for the plaintiff, not only relied on
the three previous California cases on the subject, but also utilized
decisions from other states to support its position. In United Insur-
ance Co. of America v. Wall,20 the facts were strikingly parallel
to Bower. Plaintiff had had circulatory problems in his right leg
for about eleven months prior to the issuance of the insurance pol-
icy. The policy had an exclusionary clause allowing payment only
for sickness originating more than thirty days after the policy date.
Seven months after the effective date of the policy, plaintiff's legs
were amputated due to his ailment. The court held for plaintiff,
ordering the defendant to pay the $100 per month coverage. The
court ruled that a sickness does not become manifest or active even
though the disease was present in the system prior to the date of
the insurance policy if the condition was inactive, latent, or undis-
covered. Even though plaintiff had experienced difficulty with his
legs, his doctors had not discovered any sickness or disease. The
court noted that this fact indicated that the disease had not been
18. 33 Cal. App. 3d at 1035, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 616.
19. 33 Cal. App. 3d at 1033, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 615.
20. 233 Ark. 554, 345 S.W.2d 927 (1961).
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sufficiently manifest to allow a reasonable diagnosis. In Hovis v.
Industrial Hospital Association,21 plaintiff had a similar condition
and his symptoms had been getting progressively worse in the five
years prior to surgery. He did not have a duty to seek medical ad-
vice or treatment. The Supreme Court of Washington in this case
held for plaintiff, stating that the disease had not become manifest
even though an expert testified that had plaintiff been examined
by a vascular specialist five years before, his condition would have
been discovered.
In Reiser v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Company,22 defendant
refused to issue benefits for total and permanent disability, con-
tending that the disability had not originated after the issuance of
the policy. The disability was caused by calcium deposits in the
feet, a result of manipulations performed during plaintiff's infancy
to correct congenital club feet. The plaintiff was forty years old
and, except for this period during infancy, had never experienced
any difficulty with his feet prior to the time of his disability. The
court stated that a disease, within the meaning of the policy, did
not exist prior to issuance of the policy. Instead, the disease must
be:
... [S]o considerable or significant that it would be character-
ized as such in the common speech of men .... It does not include
a latent condition which ... fails to manifest itself until after the
lapse of almost forty years. A disease does not occur or originate
within the meaning of the policy, until it becomes a disease in the
general acceptation of that term; a bodily injury does not occur or
originate within such meaning, at least until it reveals itself. 25
Skroopka v. Royal Indemnity Co., 24 the only case which held for
the insurance company, seems to conflict with the other California
cases. The Bower court maintained that there was no conflict, at
least between Skroopka and Cimino . 2  The only factual difference
between Skroopka and the other three cases was that Mrs. Skroopka
knew of her condition for a more extended period of time and
had experienced chronic pain throughout that long period. But in
United Insurance Company of America v. Wall and Hovis v. Indus-
trial Hospital Association, which relied upon the Bower case, both
21. 71 Wash. 2d 169, 426 P.2d 976 (1967).
22. 262 App. Div. 171, 28 N.Y.S.2d 283 (1941).
23. 28 N.Y.S.2d at 286.
24. 132 Cal. App. 2d 910, 283 P.2d 111 (1955).
25. 33 Cal. App. 3d 1027, 1035, 109 Cal. Rptr. 612, 617.
circumstances existed. Furthermore, in Bower plaintiff had com-
plained to his doctor of pains in his neck, back, and shoulders, some
eighteen months before the effective date of the policy. 26 However,
one can argue that the three cases just mentioned all involved a
circulatory ailment known as atherosclerosis which exists in every-
one to a certain extent and is not normally treated unless some
outward manifestation of the condition is discovered. Mrs.
Skroopka had a different ailment which was not quite as common
but one which frequently prompts women to immediately seek
medical advice.
The majority of jurisdictions recognize the enforceability of ex-
clusionary clauses which allow insurance companies to refuse pay-
ment of benefits. 27 However, the question may now be moot in
California because of the Insurance Commissioner's regulation 28 re-
stricting the application of such clauses. Today therefore, the most
significant legal application of pre-existing conditions may be their
effect upon the insured in obtaining new insurance after his present
disability policy has been rescinded or terminated. This issue
will be discussed at a later point in this comment.
B. Incontestability
The California Insurance Code has two provisions which serve
to protect the insured from overdue claims by the insurer that he
had a pre-existing condition. The incontestability clause can be
crudely described as a "statute of limitation on a defense". The
statutory provisions limit the insurer's ability to use the pre-ex-
isting condition defense except within three years from the date
of issuance of the policy.
California Insurance Code § 10350.2 is a "compulsory standard
provision" which must be present in every California disability in-
surance policy.
Form A
... (b) No claim for loss incurred or disability . . . commencing
after three years from the date of issue of this policy shall be re-duced or denied on the ground that a disease or physical condition
not excluded from coverage by name or specific description effec-
tive on the date of loss had existed prior to the effective date of
coverage of this policy. (Emphasis added.)
26. 33 Cal. App. 3d 1027, 1030, 109 Cal. Rptr. 612, 613.
27. See 53 A.L.R.2d 686, 688.
28. However, some people are still complaining about insurance com-
panies refusing payment based upon a pre-existing condition-KNBC News
Los Angeles, California, May 1, 1974, "Action 4," 5:00 p.m.
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As for noncancelable policies; Form A, as just recited, or Form
B, must be inserted.
California Insurance Code § 10350.2 Form B reads as follows:
• . . (b) No claim for loss incurred or disability commencing after
three years from the date of issue of this policy shall be reduced
or denied on the ground that a disease or description effective on
the date of loss had existed prior to the effective date of coverage
of this policy.
Form A has a more limited application because it concerns only
diseases or physical conditions that were not excluded from cover-
age by name, whereas Form B has no such provision.
The application of the incontestability clause was demonstrated
in McMachin v. Great American Reserve Insurance Company.29 In
this case, defendant insurance company attempted to use the de-
fense of a pre-existing condition in relation to a policy which was
a few years old. The court ruled that,
Not having challenged plaintiff's application within the . . . pe-
riod, defendant may be said to have taken plaintiff as it found him
and cannot now urge plaintiff's disability resulted from a pre-exist-
ing disease, illness or injury not covered by the policy. 30
In essence, it appears that the court is speaking of this defense in
estoppel terms.
CANCELLATION
A. Statutes
In purchasing disability insurance, one may choose from among
three different types of policies. Two of these policies, "noncancel-
able" and "guaranteed renewable", are defined by the California
Insurance Code.
The term "noncancelable" . . . means a policy which the insured
has the right to continue in force subject to its terms by the timely
payment of premiums in the amount originally set forth in the pol-
icy (a) until at least age 50, or (b) in the case of a policy issued
after age 44, for at least five years from its date of issue, during
which period the insurer has no right to make unilateral any
change in any provision of the policy while the policy is in force.31
A noncancelable policy is not in fact what its name implies. Ac-
29. 22 Cal. App. 3d 428, 99 Cal. Rptr. 227 (1971).
30. 22 Cal. App. 3d at 440, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 234-35.
31. CAL. INS. CODE § 10273 (West 1972).
cording to the code section, the policy can be changed or canceled
either at age fifty or five years after issuance if purchased after
age forty-four. Consequently, an older person who requires greater
medical care can be prevented from obtaining benefits from the
purchase of such a policy.
A "guaranteed renewable" policy is similar to a noncancelable
policy except that the insurer can make changes, in accordance with
the provisions of the policy, ". . . in premium rates as to all insureds
who were placed in the same class for purposes of rate determina-
tion in the process of issuance of the policy. .. 32 Again the title
of the policy is deceiving. In reality, the policy is not guaranteed
renewable because here, just as in the noncancelable policy, un-
limited changes or unilateral cancellation can occur when the in-
sured reaches age forty or, if the policy was issued after age forty-
four, five years from that time.
The third type of disability insurance is called a "cancelable"
policy. The code defines this type of insurance by describing the
provisions which are permitted in such an insurance contract. The
insurer has two optional provisions, either of which he may insert
into the contract. The first such provision reads as follows:
The insurer may cancel this policy at any time by written notice
delivered to the insured or mailed to his last address, as shown by
the records of the insurer, together with cash or the insurer's check
for the unearned portion of the premiums actually paid by the in-
sured, and such cancellation shall be without prejudice to any
claim originating prior thereto.88
The second optional cancellation provision is similar to the one
just quoted except that the insured can also cancel, upon proper
notice, if the policy was continued beyond its original term;
furthermore, this provision determines how unearned premiums are
to be computed for purposes of reimbursement should the insured
cancel under this provision.84
The insured may cancel the policy in another manner, according
to California Insurance Code § 10343. This code section is a "com-
pulsory standard provision" and must be incorporated into every
California disability insurance policy except transportation ticket
policies. The section reads as follows:
If the insured shall at any time change his occupation to one clas-
sified by the insurer as less hazardous than that stated in the pol-
icy, the insurer, upon written request of the insured, and surrender
32. CAL. INs. CODE § 10273.3 (West 1972).
33. CAL. INs. CODE § 10363 (West 1972).
34. CAL. INs. CODE § 10369.9 (West 1972).
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of the policy, will cancel the same and will return to the insured,
the unearned premiums.
B. Effective Cancellation
The optional provisions contained in the California Code §§ 10363
and 10369.9 enable the insurer to cancel by mailing or delivering
notice to the insured at his last address. In Superior Insurance
Company v. Restituto,35 this cancellation was declared effective
even though the notice was never received by the insured. The
case then explained the effect a refund has upon cancellation. Cali-
fornia Insurance Code § 481 provides that a person insured is "en-
titled to a return of premium if the policy is cancelled or rescinded"
unless the contract provides otherwise. This code section explains
the scheme by which these premiums can be refunded.3 6 Superior
Insurance Co. v. Restituto explains that where the policy provides
that the insurer can cancel upon giving notice and refunding the
unearned portion of the premium, cancellation is only effective
upon refund and is, therefore, a condition precedent. However, the
court ruled that in California, where the policy provides for the
return of unearned premiums on surrender of the policy and reten-
tion of a pro rate premium only, the return of the unearned pre-
mium is not a condition precedent to cancellation. 37 Consequently,
these two code sections, 10343 and 10369.9, whereby the insured can
cancel his policy, are more restrictive in application than the two
code sections 10363 and 10369.9, which enable the insurer to cancel.
Since the return of unearned premiums is not a condition prece-
dent the insurer can more easily cancel a policy.
In California the "... parties to an insurance policy are free,
subject to legislative restriction, to arrange the occasions, method
35. 124 F. Supp. 392 (1954).
36. CAL. INS. CODE § 481 (West 1972):
[A] person ... is entitled to a return of premium ... asfollows:
1. To the whole premium, if no part of his interest in the thing
insured is exposed to any of the perils insured against.
2. Where the insurance is made for a definite period of time, and
the insured surrenders his policy, to such proportion of the pre-
mium as corresponds with the whole premium any claim for loss or
damage under the policy which has previously accrued....
37. Jensen v. Traders & General Ins. Co., 52 Cal. 2d 786, 799, 345 P.2d
1, 8 (1959) ; Superior Ins. Co. v. Restituto, 124 F. Supp. 392, 395-6 (1954).
and means of cancellation by private agreement". 88 And this rule
applies whether the insurance is a disability policy or otherwise.8 9
However, in the law of contracts it is traditionally held that if one
party has the ability to cancel or terminate the agreement, the con-
tract is illusory and unenforceable. 40 In Naify v. Pacific Indemnity
Co.,41 which involved an automobile liability policy, the court stated
as follows:
Parties are, within reason free to contract as they please, and to
make bargains which place one party at a disadvantage; but a con-
tract must have mutuality of obligation, and an agreement which
permits one party to withdraw at his pleasure is void.... By
analogy, it seems questionable whether a contract can validly pro-
vide that A is bound thereunder unless B decides to withdraw.
42
However, this view expressed in Naify, although offered at times
to challenge the insurer's ability to cancel, is not generally recog-
nized as a competent defense in California. It appears that the
courts allow an expection to the general contract rules when in-
surance is involved because of legislative enactment, and can find
no violation of public policy in such legislative directives.
In Jensen v. Traders and General Insurance Company,43 the court
quoted the Wisconsin Supreme Court case of Putman v. Dein-
hamer44 on this subject.
But we do not find from such authorities that when the policy
terms are as they are here, and there is no conflicting statute, and
the notice and its mailing complies with the policy provisions, the
courts have refused to recognize the cancellation. In the absence
of statutory declarations there appears to be no public policy re-
moving the right to cancel in this manner from the field of con-
tract.45
The California Supreme Court in Jensen expressed the public policy
reasons for allowing an insurer to cancel an automobile insurance
policy.
The practice and custom of granting coverage immediately upon
the request of insurance agents and brokers, leaving all opportunity
to examine the acceptability of the insured to a future date, is an
38. Jensen v. Traders & General Ins. Co., 52 Cal. 2d 786, 790, 345 P.2d
1, 3.
39. Id. at 797, 345 P.2d at 7.
40. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS, § 104 (3d ed. 1957).
41. 11 Cal. 2d 5, 76 P.2d 663 (1938).
42. 11 Cal. 2d at 11, 76 P.2d at 667.
43. 52 Cal. 2d 786, 345 P.2d 1 (1959).
44. 270 Wis. 157, 70 N.W.2d 652 (1955).
45. Jensen v. Traders & General Ins. Co., 52 Cal. 2d 786, 796, 345 P.2d
1, 6-7.
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advantage to the business community and to the motoring public.
If insurers cannot cancel coverage in an equally prompt and cer-
tain manner, they will be forced to withhold this advantage....
Insurance companies have endeavored to insure rapidly and pro-
vide for a concomitant prompt and certain method of cancellation. 40
The same analogy could be used in the area of disability insur-
ance. However, the courts have set rather strict guidelines which
affect the insurer's ability to cancel. Initially, in order to establish
cancellation, the insurance company must show either that the con-
ditions upon which the company was allowed to cancel were strictly
complied with, or that the insured, knowing all the facts, waived
such compliance.4 7 At times the insured will terminate an old
policy thinking he is still covered. The courts have ruled that the
policy was cancelled conditionally upon new insurance first being
procured. 48 In this case a breakdown in communication arises be-
tween the insured and the insurer or agent, and the insured is tem-
porarily without insurance. In the intervening period the insured
suffers a loss and the company refuses payment, claiming that no
policy was in effect. A similar situation arises when the prospective
insured undergoes a physical examination and pays his first pre-
mium in anticipation of receiving coverage. Then the applicant dies
before the insurance company has formally accepted him as an in-
surable risk. The California courts have ruled that, under these
circumstances, the insurer cannot cancel or rescind the policy after
the prospective insured's death. 49 The right to rescind the contract
exists only during the life of the insured, and that right terminates
upon his death in the absence of material misrepresentation. If
the applicant ". . . had po present knowledge of the facts sought,
or failed to appreciate the significance of information related to
him, his incorrect or incomplete responses would not constitute
grounds for rescission". 50
46. 52 Cal. 2d at 798, 345 P.2d at 7-8.
47. Quong Tue Sing v. Anglo Nevada Assur. Corp., 86 Cal. 566, 25 P.
58 (1890).
48. K. C. Working Chemical Co. v. Eureka Security Fire and Marine Ins.
Co., 82 Cal. App. 2d 120, 185 P.2d 832 (1947).
49. Ranson v. Penn Mutual Life Ins. Co., 43 Cal. 2d 420, 274 P.2d 633
(1954); and Thompson v. Occidental Life Ins. Co., 9 Cal. 3d 904, 513 P.2d
353, 109 Cal. Rptr. 473 (1973).
50. Thompson v. Occidental Life Ins. Co., 9 Cal. 3d at 916, 513 P.2d at
360, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 480.
C. Damages
The term of an insurance policy can end in a variety of ways.
The policy can expire by reaching the end of the term for which
it was written, or the insurance can be terminated upon a pre-
scribed statutory notice or by mutual agreement.6 1 However, if
the policy is cancelled or repudiated after benefits accrue to the
insured, the question arises as to what damages the insured is al-
lowed. 'California Insurance Code § 650 states that an insurer may
rescind the contract, under provisions of the Code, "at any time
previous to the commencement of an action on the contract".
In Cobb v. Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Company52 the insured
purchased a noncancelable disability policy providing for payment
of health indemnity at $250.00 per month for the period throughout
which disability consists of "continuous, necessary and total loss
of business time". Two and one-half years later, plaintiff became
totally disabled as defined by the policy. However, defendant in-
surance company refused payment, claiming that plaintiff had
made fraudulent misrepresentations and suppressions of material
information bearing on the insured's health. The insurer then re-
pudiated the contract and gave notice of recission.
The trial court held that none of the acts or omissions which de-
fendant had complained of materially affected the acceptance of
the risk assumed by the insurer. Furthermore, the trial court al-
lowed damages based upon future unpaid benefits for the life ex-
pectancy of plaintiff. On appeal, the issue centered around the trial
court's awarding of these future installments. The appellate court
did not dispute the trial court's finding lack of material misrep-
resentation. However, the appellate court reversed the decision
and allowed recovery of $250.00 per month only for the time from
the insurer's repudiation to the commencement of trial.
The Cobb court held that in an action for breach of an in-
surance contract where payment is to be made in periodic install-
ments, only those installments in default at the time the suit was
brought may be recovered. Consequently, the insured's damages
for his life expectancy cannot be awarded. The court based its de-
cision upon the legal theory that no anticipatory breach of a unilat-
eral contract is allowed. Since the promisee has fully performed
on this originally bilateral contract, the agreement now becomes
51. Clausen v. Industrial Indem. Co., 241 Cal. App. 2d 440, 50 Cal. Rptr.
615 (1966).
52. 4 Cal. 2d 5,65, 51 P.2d 84 (1935).
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unilateral. Therefore "... no repudiation can amount to an antici-
patory breach of the rest of the installments not yet due".58
The Cobb case relied on two previous California decisions for its
authority. These two prior cases, Robinson v. Exempt Fire Com-
pany54 and Brix v. Peoples Mutual Life Insurance Company,55 came
to the same conclusion as Cobb based upon analogous factual situa-
tions. The Robinson case held that a disability insurance agreement
providing for periodic payment was a severable contract. Conse-
quently, the insured could only recover upon installments which
were in default until the time of commencement of trial, and he
would have to institute separate individual suits thereafter, since
each default constitutes a separate cause of action.
Brix v. Peoples Mutual Life Insurance Company (supra) con-
cerned a cancelable accident insurance policy which provided for
periodic payment should plaintiff become wholly and continuously
disabled. Upon plaintiff's disability, insurer made four monthly
payments and then refused payment of further installments; plain-
tiff then instituted suit. The court, relying on Robinson v. Exempt
Fire Company (supra), stated that defendant's action did not work
as a breach of future benefits since the liability of the insurer does
not become fixed as long as plaintiff's condition could change. 56
The court did rule, however, that the insured was entitled to re-
cover the "installments accruing between the commencement of the
action and the date of the trial".57
In a more recent federal court decision, John Hancock Mutual
Life Insurance Company v. Cohen,58 the Ninth Circuit relied upon
the three cases previously discussed to award plaintiff "an amount
equal to payments due to the date of judgment plus interest," de-
creeing that future installments shall be paid when they fall due.
The decision discussed both Corbin and Williston on the subject of
anticipatory breach, and the case is an excellent commentary on
that subject as it relates to periodic payment of insurance benefits.
53. Id. at 573, 51 P.2d at 88.
54. 103 Cal. 1, 36 P. 955 (1894).
55. 2 Cal. 2d 446, 41 P.2d 537 (1935).
56. Id. at 454, 41 P.2d at 541.
57. Id. at 456, 41 P.2d at 542.
58. 254 F.2d 417 (9th Cir. 1958).
However, the court relied on Williston's argument for disallowing
recovery of future installments.
The only argument for allowing immediate recover of a future pay-
ment due under such a (disability) policy is the hardship sup-
posedly imposed on the insured of bringing successive suits.59
Williston then maintains that this problem can be avoided by the
courts' "full exercise of equitable powers".60 He cites the United
States Supreme Court case of Mobley v. New York Life Insurance
Company6 ' which states that the insurance industry would be
harmed if future installments were allowed as damages:
[T]he calculations on which insurance business is done would be
upset, and the purposes for which the benefits were made payable
only in installments would often be defeated. 62
The John Hancock decision, unlike the Brix, Robinson and Cobb
cases, ordered the payment of future installments "when they fall
due". This solution, although not preventing the insurance com-
pany from refusing to pay those future installments, could subject
the insurer to a contempt of court charge for such a refusal. This
ruling by the court is a more equitable and progressive decision
than those which required the insured to continuously come back
into court to recover subsequent installments. However, the John
Hancock case does not directly overrule the other three cases on
this subject. Therefore, the method used in Brix, Robinson, and
Cobb of not ordering payment of future installments when they
come due appears still allowable, especially since the John Hancock
case, although decided in a California federal court, did not involve
a party who was a resident of California. The John Hancock de-
cision was based upon New Mexico law, as the case had been re-
moved to California. 68
In both the Cobb and Brix cases, actual cancellation did not occur.
The insurer merely refused further payments rather than techni-
cally canceling the policy before the accrual of benefits. Further-
more, only Cobb involved a noncancelable policy. In such a situa-
tion the question arises whether the insured is damaged from the
very act of cancellation of a noncancelable policy and, if so, whether
he is entitled to any recovery. In Caminetti v. Pacific Mutual Life
Insurance Company, 4 the holders of noncancelable disability in-
surance policies were forced to cancel those policies because of insol-
59. Id. at 425.
60. Id. at 425.
61. 295 U.S. 632 (1935).
62. 254 F.2d at 425.
63. Id. at 425.
64. 23 Cal. 2d 94, 142 P.2d 741 (1943).
[VOL. 2: 145, 1974] Disability Insurance
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
vency. Contrary to the other decisions mentioned, the court here
held that anticipatory breach existed and stated that the proper
measure of damage in this situation was the value of the policy
at the time of cancellation. The court dismissed the notion that
this value would be too uncertain to determine and felt that the
effect of that argument would ". . . render wholly valueless the
noncancelable feature of the policy. . . ."5 Consequently, the
court allowed future damages if proof could be established with
"reasonable certainty and probability that damages will result in
the future". 60 However, this case presents a unique situation, since
an insolvent insurance company cannot pay future installments
and, therefore, must pay all damages in one lump sum.
In Garage and Service Station Employee's Union, Local 665 v.
Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Company67 the plaintiff attempted
to use the Caminetti case to show anticipatory breach on the part
of the defendant, where plaintiff had cancelled the insurance pol-
icies.
Caminetti is distinguishable from the instant case .... The
court was concerned with a total involuntary repudiation of the
contract, i.e., insolvency of the insurance company which rendered
it beyond its power to respond in the future to damages. The in-
sureds there were deprived of the protection against possible future
loss which had been secured by the policy of insurance.
In the case before us, there was not involved the issue of dam-
ages for total repudiation. There is no contention that Pacific Mu-
tual cannot in the future respond for future damages. There is no
suggestion that Pacific Mutual is insolvent or is about to terminate
its affairs.68
As a result of Garage Etc. Employees Union and the other cases
prior to Caminetti, the cause of action for anticipatory breach and
recovery for future damages is quite limited. However, upon the
wrongful cancellation of a disability policy, whether it be cancelable
or non-cancelable, isn't the insured damaged by the very act of can-
cellation? And shouldn't that fact be taken into consideration
when assessing damages, regardless of the cause of the cancellation?
The Caminetti court discussed that problem in relation to its pecul-
iar factual situation.
65. Id. at 102, 142 P.2d at 745.
66. Id. at 103, 142 P.2d at 745.
67. 2 Cal. App. 3d 706, 82 Cal. Rptr. 821 (1969).
68. Id. at 711, 82 Cal. Rptr. at 823.
The insured may or may not be acceptable as a risk by any other
insurer although he does not qualify for benefits under the can-
celed policy. It may be that similar insurance in another company
is not available. In the case of a life policy, the measure may be
altered to cover such a situation. . .. But there is no fixed amount
to be paid in any event in a disability policy. Where the company
is insolvent and there are many policy holders, the difficulty of de-
termining whether or not each insured is still an insurable risk
would be practically insurmountable.0 9
I maintain that upon the insurer's cancellation of a noncancelable
policy, for whatever reason, the health of the policy-holder may
have become so impaired between the purchase of the policy and
the act of cancellation that he is no longer re-insurable or, at the
minimum, unable to obtain insurance except at a greatly increased
cost. The insured has depended upon this insurance and has pur-
chased a non-cancelable policy for a particular reason. He is ad-
versely affected by its cancellation. Therefore, damage to the in-
sured by the wrongful cancellation is inevitable. Although the
same damages may not be said to occur with a cancelable disability
policy which is canceled properly, it is submitted that the disability
insurance consumer must be more adequately informed of the type
of disability policy he is purchasing, and the manner in which it
may 'be terminated.
CASE STUDY
The following case study is presented as a further example of
the activities of the health insurance industry.
In January, 1973, Stuart Silverman purchased a student sickness
and accident insurance policy upon registration for the second se-
mester of the school year at the university he attended. This policy
was typical of those purchased by students on other college cam-
puses, and the policy provided for payment, at certain specified
rates, for hospitalization, operations, and treatment due to sickness
and accident.
In February, 1973, Mr. Silverman became ill due to a kidney ail-
ment which required surgery. He was admitted to the City of Hope
Hospital in Duarte, California for extensive tests, and in March, 1973,
surgery was performed. The City of Hope Hospital is a world
famous medical institution which conducts extensive research and
performs numerous operations to extend the scope of medical
knowledge. This facility is a non-profit charitable hospital, sup-
ported through contributions and organized auxiliaries which raise
large sums for the hospital.
69. 23 Cal. 2d at 107, 142 P.2d at 748.
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In light of its philanthropic and research-oriented philosophy, the
City of Hope does not charge its patients for treatment at its facili-
ties, but will accept insurance assignments. Consequently, Mr.
Silverman, upon discharge from the hospital, received a bill which
was marked paid by one of the auxiliaries. However, wishing to
compensate the City of Hope, Mr. Silverman assigned his claim to
the hospital.
Continental Casualty Company was the underwriter for this stu-
dent sickness and accident insurance policy #PI-63877-B04. The
company received the claim in April or May, 1973, and subsequently
refused payment. The insurance company based its refusal upon the
fact that, according to the contract, no "reasonable expenses" were
incurred (see Appendix I). They maintained that since Mr. Sil-
verman was not legally obligated to pay the City of Hope, there
were no "expenses" on his part; consequently they were not obli-
gated to pay him.
After further negotiations broke down, and after the City of Hope
declined to institute legal action based on its philanthropic philoso-
phy, Mr. Silverman filed suit in propia persona in the Superior
Court of Orange County, California.70 Silverman sued for breach
of contract, anticipatory breach of contract, breach of third party
creditor contract, intentional infliction of emotional distress, negli-
gent infliction of emotional distress, and fraud. The suit was for
$208,000 in general damages and $100,000 in punitive damages. The
real intent of, the suit was to recover compensation for the City
of Hope and to persuade Continental Casualty to change its policy
toward the Hospital.
Legally, there may be some basis by which to dispute this claim,
primarily on the issue of standing. Since Mr. Silverman did not
incur liability, there may be no controversy for which he may sue.
However, it appears that the California Attorney General has ruled
to the contrary. The California Insurance Code § 10176 states as
follows:
In disability insurance the policy may provide for payment of med-
ical, surgical, chiropractic, physical therapy . . . expenses upon a
reimbursement basis, or for the exclusion of any such services, and
provision may be made therein for payment of all or a portion of
70. Silverman v. Continental Casualty Co., #207849, filed with the Su-
perior Court of Orange Co., California, Oct. 25, 1973.
the amount of charge for such services without requiring that the
insured first pay such expenses....
The Attorney General of California responded to this section by
stating that it "does not permit issuance of disability insurance con-
tracts which require payment of medical, surgical, or hospital ex-
penses by the insured as a condition precedent to recovery thereof
from insurer".7 1 It would appear from Continental Casualty's re-
fusal to pay that they created a contract which required the insured
to pay "as a condition precedent to recovery".
Later in the negotiations it became apparent that the plaintiff
and the insurance company agreed on a monetary figure for settle-
ment. Mr. Silverman, however, was more interested in obtaining
a change in the policy of Continental Casualty. But it was not
until after the Orange County Superior Court granted defendant's
demurrer giving plaintiff leave to amend that Silverman was in-
formed by defendant that Continental had changed their policy in
July, 1973. Legal counsel for Continental Casualty had sent a letter
to the California Insurance Commissioner telling him of their
change in policy toward the City of Hope. However, the City of
Hope was not aware of that letter, and it was only through great
difficulty that Mr. Silverman was able to obtain a copy.
Upon inquiry with the California Insurance Commission, he was
informed that the letter was "confidential and privileged" and could
not be disclosed. However, a letter confirming the existence of such
a communication from Continental to the Insurance Commissioner
was received (see Appendix II). Shortly thereafter, Mr. Silverman
received a copy of the original letter from opposing counsel (see
Appendix III). The copy was sent with a cover letter from the
attorney, indicating that Continental felt that the communication
was privileged and requested that its contents not be made public.
However, the California Insurance Commissioner is an employee
of the state and works for the people. Secret communications and
confidential inquiries do little to serve the public. This letter and
the change in Continental's policy was so secret that not even the
City of Hope knew of it. Furthermore, this information was so
hidden within the corporate walls of Continental Casualty that only
after demurrer did they disclose it. This secret deal by the
California Insurance Commissioner does not appear to be an iso-
lated incident.
On one occasion, the California Insurance Department issued a
cease-and-desist order against Penn Life charging that a sampling
71. 7 Ops. Cal. Att. Gen. 227 (1946).
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of claims showed all kinds of "adverse, mistaken or unfair treat-
ment". Penn Life consented to the order without admitting any
wrongdoing. This agreement between the two contained a provi-
sion that the insurance department would issue only one press re-
lease about the matter and 'will not participate in or encourage any
further publicity' . . . . The press release, when it was issued was
ten lines long and said that Penn Life was told to make an audit
of certain California claims. There wasn't any mention of the
cease-and-desist order or the reason for it.72
In late April, 1974, over one year after his operation, Silverman
settled the case for $2000.00 plus a copy of the original letter from
Continental to the Insurance Commissioner (see Appendix III) and
a confirming letter from the Insurance Commission (Appendix II).
CONCLUSION
This comment is a look at three perhaps unrelated areas; how-
ever, in the light of recent proposed legislative reform in the health
insurance industry, these three areas are interrelated as one major
problem. The problem is the disability insurance companies' re-
fusal of benefits for various reasons, some of them often frivolous.
Today, when health insurance has become such a major issue,
reform is desperately needed to prevent denial of compensation and
benefits. A national, mandatory health system, wherein the in-
sured is adequately protected and the insurer must maintain that
protection without failure, is desperately needed in this country.
If disability insurance is required by law, it becomes extremely
difficult for such insurance to be canceled or for benefits to be
denied.78 Today the insured does have some protection because the
insurance contract has been defined by the court as an adhesion
contract, wherein the insurer has the dominant position.7 4 As a
result, insurance agreements are construed liberally in favor of the
insured 75 and all doubts and ambiguities are resolved against the
insurer.76 However, even with these advantages, the insured is in
72. Wall Street Journal, January 28, 1974, at 14, col. -.
73. Ohran v. National Auto. Ins. Co., 82 Cal. App. 2d 636, 187 P.2d 66
(1947).
74. Clausen v. Industrial Indem. Co., 241 Cal. App. 2d 440, 50 Cal. Rptr.
615 (1966).
75. Brubaker v. Beneficial Standard Life Ins. Co., 130 Cal. App. 2d 340,
278 P.2d 966 (1955).
76. Paramount Prop. Co. v. Trans. Title Ins. Co., 1 Cal. 3d 562, 463 P.2d
746, 83 Cal. Rptr. 394 (1970).
an, unsatisfactory position. By delaying or refusing a large number
of claims, as illustrated throughout this comment, disability in-
surance companies can create a windfall in profits. Those who are
denied recovery seldom take legal action to rectify the situation.
And if they do, the resolution of the problem could take years. As
in the case study illustrated, it took over one year to resolve a rela-
tively minor problem.
The average American is not adequately protected from the fi-
nancial strains of serious illness. Often he cannot rely upon the
very insurance he has purchased to prevent financial disaster or
to pay an obligation incurred due to illness. This comment has
attempted to discuss and illustrate three typical problems and how
state regulation has affected these areas. It is the purpose of this
comment to stimulate prompt action in the legislative halls of this
country to create a better, more responsive health insurance in-
dustry, dedicated to the well-being of all Americans.
JAN MARK DUDMAN
APPENDIX I
Hereby Agrees With
PEPPERDINE UNIVERSITY
LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA
(Herein Called The Policyholder)
To insure under this Policy eligible students of the Policyholder as
defined in Part II of this Policy (herein individually called the In-
sured) and their eligible dependents, if any, as defined in Part VI
(herein individually called the Insured Dependent) and, subject to
the exceptions, limitations and provisions of this Policy, promises to
pay for loss resulting, from injury or sickness other than expenses
incurred for (A) first-aid treatment for injury sustained while
participating in athletic activities; (B) treatment for injury sus-
tained while participating in the play or practice of inter-scholastic
football, and (C) services rendered without charge for the Insured
by the school's infirmary employees or salaried physicians of the
school.
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SCHEDULE
Name and Address of Policyholder Policy Number SR-99246
PEPPERDINE UNIVERSITY
23200 PACIFIC COAST HIGHWAY
MALIBU, CALIFORNIA 90265
Effective Date: AUGUST 29, 1972
PART I. EFFECTIVE DATE AND POLICY TERM
This Policy takes effect on -the effective date stated in the Schedule,
from which date all insurance years and months shall be calcu-
lated. It continues in force for the period for which premium has
been paid, subject to the grace period provided in Part IX. It may
be renewed for further consecutive periods by payment of pre-
mium as herein provided, subject to the Company's right to de-
cline renewal of this Policy as of the first anniversary date or any
anniversary date thereafter by giving written notice to the Policy-
holder of such declination at least 31 days prior to such date.
All periods of insurance hereunder shall begin and end at 12:01
A.M., Standard Time, at the Policyholder's place of business as
stated herein.
P1-63877-B04
PART Ir. ELIGIBILITY
All students who register for attendance as full time students at
the Policyholder as regularly enrolled graduate or undergraduate
students and dependents of Insured Students.
PART III. EFFECTIVE DATE OF INDIVIDUAL INSURANCE
The insurance or eligible Students and their Dependents for whom
written application is made on or before the effective date of this
Policy shall take effect on said effective date. The insurance of
eligible Students and Dependents for whom written application is
made after the effective date thereof shall take effect on the date
stated in the name list furnished to the Company by the Policy-
holder.
The Policyholder agrees to submit to the Company within 20 days
after the effective date of this Policy and the first day of each sub-
sequent school term the name of each student and Dependent in-
sured hereunder and the effective date of insurance as to each In-
sured Person.
PART IV. INDIVIDUAL TERMINATIONS
The insurance of any Insured Student shall immediately terminate
on the earliest of the following dates:
(A) on the date this Policy is terminated;
(B) on the premium due date next following the date the
Insured Student ceases to be an eligible student;
(C) on the premium due date next following the date the In-
sured Student gives notice to the Policyholder of the termi-
nation of coverage, or
(D) on the premium due date if the Policyholder fails to pay the
required premium for the Insured Person, except as the re-
sult of inadvertent error.
The insurance of any Insured Dependent shall immediately ter-
minate:
(A) on the date the insurance of the Insured Student is ter-
minated;
(B) on the premium due date next following the date the
Insured Student of whom the Insured Dependent is a
Dependent gives notice to the Policyholder of termination
of coverage of such Insured Dependent;
(C) on the date such person ceases to be an eligible Dependent;
or
(D) on the premium due date if the Policyholder fails to pay
the required premium for the Insured Person, except as
the result of inadvertent error.
CONTINUATION OF COVERAGE FOR INCAPACITATED
DEPENDENT CHILD WHEN TERMINATION AGE
LIMIT FOR CHILDREN IS ATTAINED
Notwithstanding anything to the contrary stated in this Policy, it
is hereby agreed that if an unmarried dependent child is incapable
of self-sustaining employment by reason of mental retardation or
physical handicap and who became so incapable prior to attainment
of age nineteen and who is chiefly dependent upon the Insured for
support and maintenance and if, within thirty-one days of the date
such dependent child's coverage under the policy would otherwise
terminate due to attainment of the termination age for children, the
Company receives due proof of such incapacity, the coverage of such
dependent child under the policy may be continued at the option of
the Insured for so long as this Policy remains in force and the
dependent remains in such condition. The premium applicable to
such incapacitated dependent child shall be at the premium rate
applicable for such coverage to adult insureds at issue age twenty-
two and shall thereafter be subject to the same adjustments appli-
cable to the adult rate in accordance with the terms of this Policy.
Insurance of any Insured Person shall not be prejudiced by the
failure on the part of the Policyholder to transmit reports, pay
premium, or comply with any of the provisions of this Policy when
such failure is due to inadvertent error or clerical mistake.
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PART V. PREMIUM AND PREMIUM RATES
This Policy is issued in consideration of the payment of a premium
equal to at least the first term premium under the policy. The
premium rate is:
Per Trimester Per Semester
Student Only $15.00 $17.00
Student and Spouse $40.00 $45.50
Student, Spouse and Children $50.00 $56.75
The Policyholder agrees to make an audit within twenty days after
the effective date of this Policy, and within twenty days after the
end of each subsequent insurance term to submit to the Company,
subject to the grace period provided in Part IX the premium for the
period covered by such audit.
PART VI. DEFINITIONS
"Injury" wherever used in this Policy means bodily injury caused
by an accident occurring while this Policy is in force and resulting
directly and independently of all other causes in loss covered by
this Policy as to the Insured Person whose injury is the basis of
claim.
"Sickness" wherever used in this Policy means sickness or disease
causing loss commencing while this Policy is in force as to the
Insured Person whose sickness is the basis of claim.
"Insured Person" as used herein means either the Insured Student
or the Insured Dependent.
"Insured Dependent" as used herein means the Insured's lawful
spouse (if not eligible as a Student) and each unmarried child or
children, who are not self-supporting and are under 19 years of age
and, if attending a college or other school on a full time basis,
between the ages of 19 and 22 years of age inclusive, insured here-
under.
"Hospital" means an institution which meets all of the following
requirements: (1) holds a license as a hospital (if licensing is
required in the state); (2) operates primarily for the reception,
care and treatment of sick, ailing or injured persons as in-patients;
(3) provides 24-hour a day nursing service by registered or grad-
uate nurses; (4) has a staff of one or more licensed physicians
available at all times; (5) provides organized facilities for diagnosis
and surgical facilities; and (6) is not primarily a clinic, nursing,
rest or convalescent home and is not, other than incidentally, a
place for alcoholics or drug addicts. Confinement in a special unit
of a hospital used primarily as a nursing, rest or convalescent home
is deemed with respect to the coverages provided by this Policy, to
be confined in an institution other than a hospital.
"Reasonable Expense" means the usual and customary fee or charge
for the services rendered and the supplies furnished in the area
where such services are rendered or supplies furnished, provided
such services and supplies are recommended and approved by a
physician or surgeon, other than the Insured Person.
PART VII. DESCRIPTION OF BENEFITS
SECTION I. PHYSICIAN, SURGEON, DENTAL,
HOSPITAL, NURSE, X-RAY, LABORATORY
AND AMBULANCE EXPENSE-ACCIDENT
When injury shall require treatment by a currently licensed physi-
cian or surgeon, dental treatment to natural teeth, confinement
within a hospital, use of ambulance or employment of a graduate or
licensed nurse, the Company will pay, in addition to any other
indemnity payable, the reasonable expense incurred by the Insured
Person within 26 weeks after the date of the accident for such
treatment, hospital confinement, ambulance and nurse services,
not to exceed $1,000.00 as the result of any one accident.
With respect to x-ray and laboratory expense incurred as the result
of an accident, and when such treatment is rendered as an out-
patient in a hospital or in -the office of a currently licensed physician
the Company will pay the reasonable expenses incurred in excess
of the first $15.00, not to exceed $50.00 as the result of any
one accident.
SECTION II. HOSPITAL ROOM AND
BOARD EXPENSE-SICKNESS
When sickness shall require confinement within a hospital, com-
mencing while the policy is in force as to the Insured Person, the
Company will pay the reasonable expense incurred for hospital
room and board by the Insured for the period of such confinement,
not to exceed $40.00 per day nor to exceed 30 days of
hospital confinement as the result of any one sickness.
SECTION III. MISCELLANEOUS HOSPITAL
EXPENSE-SICKNESS
The Company will pay the reasonable expense incurred by the
Insured Person during the period of hospital confinement for which
expense is payable in the Hospital Room and Board Expense-
Sickness provision for anesthetics, anesthetist's fee when charged by
the hospital, operating room, laboratory tests, x-rays, oxygen tent,
drugs, medicines and dressings not to exceed in the aggregate
$250.00 as the result of any one sickness.
In the event an anesthetist's fee is not charged by the hospital, the
Company will pay the reasonable expense incurred not to exceed
25% of the maximum amount applicable to the operation
performed as provided in Schedule of Operation, subject however
to aggregate payable under this Part.
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SECTION IV. SURGICAL EXPENSE-SICKNESS
When sickness of the Insured Person shall, during the period the
policy is in force as to the Insured Person require a surgical opera-
tion listed in the following Schedule of Operations, the Company
will pay the reasonable expense incurred for such operation, in-
cluding post-operative care, but not in excess of an amount repre-
sented by the Relative Unit Value set opposite the operation multi-
plied by $5.00 nor in excess of $500.00 for all operations as
the result of any one sickness.
SECTION V. PHYSICIAN EXPENSE WHEN
HOSPITAL CONFINED-SICKNESS
When by reason of sickness the Insured Person shall require the
services of a currently licensed physician or surgeon while confined
within a hospital for which expense is: payable under the Hospital
Room and Board Expense provision, the Company will pay the
reasonable expenses incurred for such treatment, exclusive of sur-
gical procedure and post-operative care, not to exceed $7.00
per visit for each visit such treatment is rendered nor to exceed
in the aggregate $175.00 as the result of any one sickness.
SECTION VI. PHYSICIAN EXPENSE WHEN
NOT HOSPITAL CONFINED-SICKNESS
When by reason of sickness the Insured Person shall be necessarily
and personally treated by a currently licensed physician or surgeon
while not confined in a hospital, the Company will pay the reason-
able expense incurred for such treatment, exclusive of surgical pro-
cedures and post-operative care, not to exceed $7.00 per visit,
beginning with the second visit, for each visit such treatment is
rendered nor to exceed in the aggregate $175.00 as the result
of any one sickness.
SECTION VII. AMBULANCE EXPENSE-SICKNESS
When by reason of sickness an ambulance is necessary to transport
any Insured Person to or from a hospital on account of hospital
confinement for which expense is payable under the Hospital Room
and Board Expense provision, the Company will pay the reasonable
expense incurred for such ambulance services, not to exceed in the
aggregate $25.00 as the result of any one sickness.
SCHEDULE OF OPERATIONS
Relative
Unit
Value
Abdomen
Surgical puncture of abdomen
adhesions, division of -----....------ ....---------- ....  ...................--- 30
appendectom y -............ ..--- - - --- --............................................ 30
Joining gall bladder to intestine --................-----------------------.. 50
Colon resection-Removal of large intestine
Total including colostomy ----------------- 100
Cutting out of intestinal lesions, without rejoining 50
Removal of stomach
Total -.......................-------------- 70
Partial -...-.--------- ...-.- ... .......---------------------------------.............--- 50
Joining of intestine to stomach -...-----..............................-------------- 50
Inguinal or femoral repair of hernia
Single ------.-.----.-.-------.-.-.-.-.----------------.-.-----------.-....---------------- -- - 30
Bilateral -----------..........-------------------.................... ....-------- 40
Hiatus or diaphragmatic repair of hernia -...................... 60
Amputations
Amputation at elbow joint --------- ---.................-------------------- 30
Amputation at knee --.-.-....---.-...------.-..-.----- ... .........------------ --- ---- 30
Amputation of arm, including bones of shoulder ------- 75
Bones
Removal of bone spur with autogenous bone implant -------- 30
Bunion operation
Unilateral --------------------------.-.---------------.-................------------------ ---- - 20
Bilateral ----------..---------.-.----.-.- . .. . .... . .........----------- - 30
Shortening of Bone Including Bone Grafting
Fem ur ---------------------------------.-.------------.-.-.---.-.-----.........-------------- - --- 60
Tibia, Hum erus ---------------------------.. .............-- -- --- . - ----- -.- -  50
Radius, Ulna ------------..-..---.-.-.--.- .................------ - ..-- ----- ------- 40
Eye, Ear, Nose and Throat
Ear
Cutting into cardum, under general anesthesia ------ 4
Cutting into cardum, not under general anesthesia 3
Cutting away of inner ear --------.-.---...........................--------------- 80
Freeing of adhesion of inner ear--- ------ 50
Eye
Plastic Repair of Eye Socket - - --.......................................... 60
Repair of Squinting Eye
One Eye -----.- .............------------- ------- . .. . . . .. ... 40
Both Eyes ----- -- ----- ----- 50
Nose and Throat
Cutting into Sinus Cavity
Sim ple --------------------------------------.-.-------...........---------------------- - - - 15
Radical ......--- -- --- ........ .... 25
Tonsillectomy, with or without adenoidectomy- 15
Cutting into windpipe ---------------------------- 20
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Gynecology
Removal of uterus, vaginal approach -...............------- - -50
Uterus, suspension of, any type, with or without dilation
and curretage or surgery on tubes or ovaries ----------..---- 35
Heart and Blood Vessels
Artery Graft or Cutting
Inter-Abdominal -----....--------------------- ....  ..-.-.-....... - - ---- ---  80
Intrathoracic -....-----.-.-.---------.-.-.-----------------.--.......------------- ---- - 80
Extremities -------------------------.------....................------. .- - -- - - 50
Joining or Forming a Connection Between Arteries
Aortic Anastomosis -..-...-.---- ...................------- - --- .----- 100
Pulmonary Anastomosis -....------------------ .................. -- - -- - --  100
Veins
Removal of clot from Vein
Extremities 25
Varicose Veins
Litigation with or without division Saphenous
Vein with Stripping on same or successive days
Unilateral -.. .-.. ..................-------------------------- 20
Bilateral ------- ------------------........-------------..... 30
Forming Connection Between Veins
Porto-Caval --------------- . . ......-------------- 100
M esen teric -.-.-.---.-.-.-.-- .-.-.-.-.- -. .-.-.-. .-.-.. -. -.-.-----------......... 80
Neurosurgery
Drainage of Subdural, Epidural or Brain Abcess or
Hematoma --------------------- 50
Repair or freeing of adhesions of nerve
One Nerve -----------..-...--.-..-.-.----.-.--------------.- ...--- --.- ------- -  -  15
More than one Nerve---- 25
Surgical Division of Nerves of Spinal Cord ------------- 100
Removal of Posterior Arch of a Vertebra - ----- 70
Tapping at Lower Part of Spinal Canal - ------ 3
Cutting away of Sympathetic Nerve of the Neck
Unilateral -------------------------- 50
Bilateral- ------------------ 75
Cutting away of the Base of the Spine
Unilateral ----------------------------------------.-....................------------------ 50
B ilateral --------...--- .- . -.-.-.-----.-..-.--.-.-----.... . . ....-------- -. . 70
Plastic Surgery
Plastic Operation on Lip
Unilateral---------- ---- ------ - - ------ 60
Bilateral -..----............ ---------... - - -- - - --.-.-.-.-....---------- 80
Repair of Claw or Clubfoot-Bilateral ----- 7
Proctologic Surgery
Removal of Fistula
Single 7 - - 20
Multiple ----------- 35
Hemorrhoidectomy, External and Internal ------- ------- 20
Tendons
Graft, Transfer or Transplant of Tendon, Distal to
Shoulder or Hip
Single ---- -------- ----------------......----------.. 30
Each Additional Tendon -------.........--------------.- - 5
Lengthening or Shortening of Tendon - - -- ---- ---------- 20
Thorax or Chest
Esophagus
Removal of Pocket from Gullet
Cervical Approach ------------------ -------------------- - ---- - -- - --40
Thoratic Approach ---------------- ........----------------------- 70
Lung
Partial Removal of Lobe of Lung ---------- ..........- ----------------- 70
Removal of Membrane covering Lung and
Lining Chest Cavity ---.........----------------------..........-------- 70
Tumors or Cysts
Drainage of Cyst at Base of Spine --------.....................----------- 3
Removal of Benign Tumors by Surgical Procedure
Superficial, including warts by Excision, Tumors of
Face, Neck, Genitalia, Hands or Feet
One Tum or --------- ....--------------.-.-.--.-.------------ .. ....... .-------- ---- 3
Each Additional Tumor ---------------------------.......------ - -  3
Urologic Surgery
Operation for Abcess of Prostate Gland -----------....--------- 30
Suture of K idney -..------------------------..------------- ................ - ----  - 60
Removal of Prostate Gland
Perineal ------------------- .................................--------------- --- - -  65
Transplant Operation on Tube from Kidney to Bladder
Unilateral -- -- 55
B ila teral -------....................................................... .............-- - 70
The Company will pay, subject to the limit provided, for dental
surgery. covered hereunder and for operations not named above
amounts objectively determined on the basis of comparative severity
with operations which are named, but not less than the minimum nor
more than the maximum provided for operations named.
PART VIII. EXCLUSIONS
The policy does not cover the expense of (1) dental treatment ex-
cept as provided in Part VII, Section I, (2) services rendered by
the School's Infirmary, infirmary employees. or salaried physicians
of the School; (3) replacing eyeglasses or prescriptions therefor;
(4) preventive medicines or vaccines; (5) first-aid treatment for
injuries sustained while participating in athletic activities; nor
does this Policy cover any loss caused by or resulting from (6) sick-
ness resulting from pregnancy, childbirth or miscarriage; (7) ac-
cident occurring in consequence of riding as a passenger or other-
wise in any vehicle or device for aerial navigation, except as a fare
paying passenger in an aircraft operated by an established concern
organized to operate an airplane service and licensed for the car-
riage of passengers for hire; (8) declared or undeclared war or any
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act thereof; (9) injury sustained in consequence of participating in
the play or practice of interscholastic football; or (10) injury sus-
tained or sickness contracted while in the service of the armed
forces of any country. Upon any Insured entering the armed
forces of any country, a pro-rata refund of premium will be made;(11) injury or sickness for which benefits are payable under any
Workmen's Compensation or Occupational Disease Act or Law;
(12) suicide or any attempt thereat while sane or self-destruction
or any attempt thereat while insane.
PART IX. UNIFORM PROVISIONS
ENTIRE CONTRACT: CHANGES: This Policy constitutes the
entire contract between the parties, and no statement made by the
Policyholder or any Insured Person whose. eligibility has been ac-
cepted by the Company shall void the insurance or reduce the
benefits under this Policy or be used in defense to a claim hereunder.
No change in this Policy shall be valid unless approved by an ex-
ecutive officer of the Company and unless such approval be en-
dorsed hereon or attached hereto. No agent has authority to change
this Policy or to waive any of its provisions.
GRACE PERIOD: Unless not less than 31 days prior to the pre-
mium due date the Company has delivered to the Policyholder or
has mailed to the last address as shown by the records of the Com-
pany written notice of its intention not to renew this Policy beyond
for which the premium has been accepted a grace period of 31 days
will be granted for the payment of premiums accruing after the
first premium, during which grace period the policy shall con-
tinue in force, but the Policyholder shall be liable to the Company
for the payment of the premium accruing for the period the policy
continues in force.
If any premium be not paid within the days of grace, this Policy
shall thereupon be discontinued, but the Policyholder shall, never-
theless, be liable to the Company for the payment of all premiums
then unpaid, together with the premiums for the days of grace.
If however, written notice is given by the Policyholder to the
Company, during the grace period, that this Policy is to be dis-
continued, this Policy shall then be discontinued on the date of
receipt by the Company of such written notice, but the Policy-
holder shall, nevertheless, be liable to the Company for the payment
of all premiums then unpaid, together with a pro rata premium for
the period commencing with the date on which the last premium
became due ending with the date of receipt of such written notice
by the Company.
NOTICE OF CLAIM: Written notice of claim must be given to the
Company within 30 days after the occurrence or commencement of
any loss covered by this policy, or as soon thereafter as is reason-
ably possible. Notice given by or on behalf of the claimant to the
Company at 310 South Michigan Avenue, Chicago, Illinois, or to any
authorized agent of the Company, with information sufficient to
identify the Insured Person shall be deemed notice to the Company.
CLAIM FORMS: The Company, upon receipt of a written notice
of claim, will furnish to the claimant such forms as are usually
furnished by it for filing proofs of loss. If such forms are not -fur-
nished within 15 days after the giving of such notice the claimant
shall be deemed to have complied with the requirements of this
Policy as to proof of loss upon submitting, within the time fixed
in this Policy for filing proofs of loss, written proof covering the
occurrence, the character and the extent of the loss for which
claim is made.
PROOFS OF LOSS: Written proof of loss must be furnished to the
Company within 90 days after the termination of the period for
which the Company is liable. Failure to furnish such proof within
the time required shall not invalidate nor reduce any claim if it was
not reasonably possible to give proof within such time, provided
such proof is furnished as soon as reasonably possible and in no
event, except in the absence of legal capacity of the claimant, later
than one year from the time proof is otherwise required.
TIME OF PAYMENT OF CLAIM: Indemnities payable under this
Policy for any loss other than loss for which this Policy provides
periodic payments will be paid as they accrue immediately upon
receipt of due written proof of such loss. Subject to due written
proof of loss, all accrued indemnity for loss for which this Policy
provides periodic payment will be paid each month and any balance
remaining unpaid upon the termination of the period of liability
will be paid immediately upon receipt of due written proof.
PAYMENT OF CLAIMS: All indemnities becoming payable here-
under will be payable to the Insured.
If any indemnity of this Policy shall be payable to the estate of an
Insured Person or to an Insured who is a minor or otherwise not
competent to give a valid release, the Company may pay such in-
demnity up to an amount not exceeding One Thousand Dollars -to
any relative by blood or connection by marriage of the Insured
Person or beneficiary who is deemed by the Company to be equi-
tably entitled thereto. Any payment made by the Company in good
faith pursuant to this Provision shall fully discharge the Company
to the extent of such payment.
PHYSICAL EXAMINATION: The Company at its own expense
shall have the right and opportunity to examine the person of any
Insured Person whose injury or sickness is the basis of claim when
and as often as it may reasonably require during the pendency of a
claim hereunder.
LEGAL ACTION: No action -at law or in equity shall be brought
to recover on this Policy prior to the expiration of 60 days after
written proof of loss has been furnished in accordance with the
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requirements of this Policy. No such action shall be brought after
the expiration of three years after the time written proof of loss
is required to be furnished.
CONFORMITY WITH STATE STATUTES: Any provision of this
Policy which, on its effective date, is in conflict with the statutes
of the state in which this Policy was delivered or issued for de-
livery is hereby amended to conform to the minimum requirements
of such statute.
This Policy is not in lieu of and does not affect any requirements
for coverage by Workmen's Compensation Insurance.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Continental Casualty Company has
caused this Policy to be signed by its President and Secretary; but
the same shall not be binding upon the Company unless counter-
signed by its duly authorized agent.
Secretary President
Countersigned by ---...-------------------..........................--------------------------------.-----
Licensed Resident Agent
APPENDIX II
April 22, 1974
Stuart Silverman
2022 Victoria
Anaheim, California 92804
Dear Mr. Silverman:
This letter is in response to your telephone inquiry of April 17,
1974. Please be advised that Continental Casualty Company has
informed us that as of July 11, 1973 they will pay for charges
made by the City of Hope when such charges are covered under
their policies.
r trust this information will enable you to resolve your pending
law suit regarding Continental Casualty's procedures in regard to
City of Hope claims.
Very truly yours,
GLEESON L. PAYNE
Insurance Commissioner
By John M. Fogg
Counsel
APPENDIX III
July 11, 1973
Hon. Gleeson L. Payne
Insurance Commissioner
Department of Insurance
1 407 Market Street
San Francisco, California 94103
Re: City of Hope Medical Center
Dear Commissioner Payne:
As I had previousy advised in my letter of June 22, 1973, our
Companies were studying your request for recognition of assign-
ments by our insureds to the City of Hope Medical Center.
We are pleased to advise that the following companies will hence-
forth honor assignments made by our insureds to the City of
Hope Medical Center recognizing such assignment as representing
"expenses incurred" under the contract even though in the absence
of insurance the patient incurs no obligation for such expenses:
Continental Assurance Company
Continental Casualty Company
American Casualty Company
Transportation Insurance Company
Valley Forge Life Insurance Company
While we agree to henceforth consider charges made by the City
of Hope as being "expenses incurred" under the contract, payment
of benefits will only be made if the confinement in one otherwise
covered under the terms of the contract and that confinement in
such institution is not specifically excluded under the terms of the
contract.
Very truly yours,
Donald M. Lowry
Assistant General Counsel
DML: ck
bcc: H. Parsons 20W
I. Silchuck 9E
W. Shomaker 12W
